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16GUJARC 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----x 2 3 NICHOLAS JARECKI, 4 Plaintiff, 5 11 CV 2002(GBD) V. MICHAEL OHOVEN, INFINITY MEDIA, INC., 6 7 Defendants. 8 New York, N.Y. 9 June 16, 2011 10:50 a.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. GEORGE B. DANIELS 12 District Judge 13 APPEARANCES 14 RITHOLZ LEVY SANDERS 15 Attorneys for Plaintiff BY: JEFF SANDERS 16 JUSTIN R. LEITNER 17 NIXON PEABODY LLP 18 Attorneys for Defendants BY: JOSEPH J. ORTEGO 19 BRIAN C. AVELLO 20 21 22 23 24 25

(Case called)

THE COURT: Mr. Ortego or Mr. Avello, let me hear you first with respect to the motion.

MR. ORTEGO: Your Honor, I assume that you would like me to address the motion with regard to venue first?

THE COURT: With regard to personal jurisdiction.

MR. ORTEGO: Yes, I would.

I was also going to bring to the Court's attention, the motion with regard to jurisdiction and there's been reply papers with the preliminary injunction. I will not address that and, also, I will not address the recent request for summary judgment. I will just simply address our motions.

Judge, on behalf of the defendants, we respectfully request that the case be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on our motion and a lack of personal jurisdiction and on improper venue. In the alternative, if the Court finds that there is subject matter jurisdiction and if the Court finds that there is personal jurisdiction over our clients in this particular case, we respectfully request that the matter be transferred to the Central District of California, the federal court which we believe is the proper venue.

THE COURT: Let me just put one issue aside very directly. Let me just first address the subject matter jurisdiction. If you tell me that your clients make no claim that the plaintiff in this case is not the author and copyright

owner and that you make a claim that you are the author and share copyright ownership, then if you tell me that you stipulate that they are the copyright owner, then I am willing to dismiss your case and enter such an order.

MR. ORTEGO: Judge, I actually anticipated that question from you, and I think it would put me in a nice dilemma and a box --

THE COURT: That's the nature of the issue, isn't it?

MR. ORTEGO: Yes, it is, Judge. And I think at this

point in time, I will take the position that I cannot concede

or stipulate that we don't have an interest in the copyright.

THE COURT: It is kind of hard for me to say there is no subject matter jurisdiction.

MR. ORTEGO: Well, Judge, I would think so. Your Honor is a good lawyer --

THE COURT: Let's deal with that first.

MR. ORTEGO: So I can save your Honor the argument that Mr. Avello helped prepare for me for the subject matter jurisdiction.

THE COURT: Your argument was very persuasive.

MR. ORTEGO: I thought so, Mr. Avello.

Judge, with regard to the personal jurisdiction, I look at this case and I look under different ways in which the Court can have personal jurisdiction in this particular case over our clients and, quite frankly, I don't see it. I look at

it in a different way. There was no purposeful action or conduct conducted in this particular jurisdiction. And I look at the various different approaches in which the plaintiffs try to impute jurisdiction, and I find it difficult because, first, they try to have that there was a harm done within the state and somehow that harm was done within the state by out-of-state residents. I find that fails. And with regard to the contacts in the state, I find that also fails.

This was a dispute between, I guess, folks in the Hollywood movie industry. They get involved in a particular dispute. Everything that took place with regard to this action took place in California. I even submit to the Court that the plaintiff who asserts that jurisdiction is appropriate here, that he may be a New York resident, but he is back in California, my understanding is, as we attempt to serve him with regard to the case that is pending out in California now.

THE COURT: Is it your understanding -- and I can ask them -- that he is both a resident of New York and a resident of California?

MR. ORTEGO: My understanding -- and, Judge, I am not in the best position to do that -- but that he was a resident of New York while the film was being filmed here in New York, and from that perspective, he was and no longer is. He may have been here temporarily during that time. And I take the position that he is a resident of California that visited New

York.

THE COURT: Then let me ask it a different way. Is it your position that his domicile is California?

MR. ORTEGO: It is, your Honor.

THE COURT: I want to sort of figure out what overlapping time period we are talking about. I want to see whether I should isolate my assessment on the pre-production contacts between the parties as opposed to the film being made in New York.

When was the film made?

MR. ORTEGO: The relationship between the parties, I think, would have terminated between December 2010. The production of the film and the filming of the film took place subsequent to that.

THE COURT: That is my understanding. When do you say the time frame was?

MR. ORTEGO: Up until December 2010 would be the time before the film was produced, and sometime after January 2011 they produced the film in New York.

THE COURT: Between January --

MR. ORTEGO: It was completed and now my understanding is -- and I profess I am not an expert on this, your Honor -- but the film is now being produced, modified and having sound put out in California. They are now back out in California now.

THE COURT: You say basically production began in January?

MR. ORTEGO: That's my understanding.

THE COURT: And the relationship between the parties basically fell apart in December, I guess, pretty much around the time their L.A. counsel responded to you saying that they did not intend to sign what you considered to be an oral agreement?

MR. ORTEGO: I think that the relationship completely broke down probably in December 2010. The letter from the in-house counsel for the corporate defendant went out in March. And then there is another letter from L.A. counsel that subsequently came up in their reply letters when the parties were negotiating back and forth, I think, and posturing.

THE COURT: You say March of 2010 --

MR. ORTEGO: No, March of 2011 is when the letter took place, is my understanding.

THE COURT: What do you say ended the relationship in December of 2010?

MR. ORTEGO: I think what ended the relationship was the discovery of the defendants in this particular case that they were out and that the person that they had as an independent contractor working with them had affiliated itself with the plaintiff and was going to produce the movie for the plaintiff.

THE COURT: How did it end? 1 MR. ORTEGO: I think Mr. Turen advised our clients 2 3 that he would no longer work for them and no longer be an independent contractor for them and that he was going to work 4 5 directly with the plaintiffs. 6 THE COURT: I assume subsequent to that in December 7 there were no other joint activities between the parties? MR. ORTEGO: My understanding, they had ceased at that 8 9 time. 10 THE COURT: And the communication between the parties 11 was either totally or substantially between the lawyers after 12 this. 13 MR. ORTEGO: Judge, I was not a party at that time to 14 this litigation, but my understanding and my review of the 15 files, that's what happened. 16 THE COURT: Let me put it in context and then you can 17 continue. (Fire drill alarm sounds) 18 THE COURT: I apologize. We have a fire drill, so we 19 20 are going to have to vacate the building. 21 MR. ORTEGO: It is not indicative of my argument, I 22 hope. 23 THE COURT: I couldn't tell you. I didn't call the

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fire drill.

Let me just check.

(Pause)

THE COURT: We are going to have to evacuate the building and come back. I am assuming it will be about 45 minutes.

(Recess)

(Case recalled)

THE COURT: We can continue, Mr. Ortego.

MR. ORTEGO: Your Honor, you had asked me a question before we had the fire drill break about when the parties had severed relationship, so I took that opportunity, and according to the declaration of the plaintiff, Mr. Jarecki, his preliminary injunction declaration, paragraph 7, he indicated that on or about December 5, 2010, he broke off all negotiations and relationships with my clients.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. ORTEGO: Judge, at this point, with regard to jurisdiction, there is no purposeful action on behalf of our clients. They felt that they are nondomiciliary here. They thought that they were dealing with a California resident at all times, and so they never believed any of their actions would cause jurisdiction within our great state.

The plaintiff alleges that there are certain e-mails and phone calls. The defendants always operated with the knowledge that they believed and they thought that the plaintiff lived in California where they had seen him.

16GUJARC The e-mail address, I don't think, is any way 1 indicative of whether the e-mail address was in New York or in 2 3 California; it was the same e-mail address they used for him. 4 Telephone calls, they called him on a cell phone and 5 they knew at one time that he had been in New York, but they 6 had no idea they were transacting business in New York at the 7 time. THE COURT: Was there any letter correspondence 8 9 between the parties? MR. ORTEGO: With a New York address? 10 11 THE COURT: With any address -- was there any letter 12 correspondence with any address? 13 MR. ORTEGO: I think there was correspondence between

MR. ORTEGO: I think there was correspondence between the lawyers, but other than that, I am not aware of any.

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THE COURT: Is there any other phone number that was called or address that was identified as being the plaintiff's New York address to the defendant?

MR. ORTEGO: Not that I am aware of, Judge. My understanding was that there was a California lawyer that we were negotiating with that was always venued in California, and that address we were aware of. We also were aware of a California address, but I don't think that prior to the termination there was a New York address that we were aware of or ever saw.

THE COURT: What about Mr. Turen's activities?

MR. ORTEGO: Mr. Turen's activities are kind of interesting. Mr. Turen worked for us. Mr. Turen had some connections in New York. We did not send him to New York to negotiate. He went to New York on his own. He had personal business, we found out. And, subsequently, Mr. Turen visited the center which is referenced in their papers and when Mr. Turen got together with the plaintiffs and they made the decision to drop working with our client, the plaintiffs — which is part of our conspiracy theory — and he said he would market the picture himself without Infinity and he would do it himself and they would terminate our client.

THE COURT: What is the activity that Mr. Turen engaged in, either on his own or on behalf of the defendant, that took place in New York?

MR. ORTEGO: My understanding, Judge, nothing on behalf of my client.

THE COURT: What about not on behalf of your client? What is the activity that you are aware of that he was engaged in prior to December in relationship -- my recollection is he was president or chairman of the board of Infinity?

MR. ORTEGO: He was an independent contractor, actually.

THE COURT: Somebody gave him a title.

MR. ORTEGO: He did have a title, but he was an independent contractor not an employee.

THE COURT: What was his title? 1 MR. ORTEGO: I think he was a former president of 2 3 Infinity. 4 THE COURT: He was the president? 5 MR. ORTEGO: He was, Judge. 6 THE COURT: It is kind of awkward for me to get my 7 mind around how he is the president of a company at the same time that he is an independent contractor. 8 9 MR. ORTEGO: I agree, your Honor. It is hard to get 10 around -- it is also kind of difficult to understand how if he 11 was the president of the company, how he would negotiate a deal 12 for himself and then resign as president. 13 THE COURT: I have seen that happen before. 14 MR. ORTEGO: I know you probably have, Judge. 15 THE COURT: Either he was the president of the company at the time and had authority to act as president of the 16 17 company or he wasn't. If he is president of the company, it is irrelevant whether he is otherwise some sort of independent 18 19 contractor. He is not independent if he is the president of 20 the company. 21 MR. ORTEGO: Judge, I can understand that distinction, 22 and I cannot necessarily disagree from the appearance of title, 23 but he certainly could not have had the authority with regard

to president of the company to negotiate his company -- to sell

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out his company to start --

THE COURT: That is not the issue. I am not worried about the part where you say he sold out. I am trying to figure out what role he had as president, what his authority was as president and what ability he had to speak for the company during the period of time that he was acting as president on the company's behalf.

MR. ORTEGO: Judge, he obviously is president. It is hard for me to argue that he could not represent the company because he was doing that. I will answer that question yes.

We have no knowledge that he had gone to New York on two different occasions in November and December on behalf of us or activities involving the company. We had learned that he had come to visit family in New York, and it turns out that he had done more than that in New York.

THE COURT: What is the activity that you are now subsequently aware of that he was engaged in, in relationship to the company when everyone was still on friendly terms?

MR. ORTEGO: Our understanding was he was doing nothing on behalf of the company.

THE COURT: What did he come to New York for?

MR. ORTEGO: Personal reasons, family.

THE COURT: What did he do in New York in relationship to advancing the film?

MR. ORTEGO: Judge, at this point in time, I don't think we learned what he was doing in New York other than

personal activity until after this all came about.

THE COURT: Is it your position that at the time that he was going to New York -- as I say, the company is a fiction, so I am not going to worry about what the company knew in that sense -- Mr. Ohoven was unaware that he was in New York doing business on behalf of Infinity in relationship to the making of this film?

MR. ORTEGO: Judge, before I represent that, that is my understanding.

THE COURT: What is the current status of your contractual dispute?

MR. ORTEGO: An action has been filed in the Superior Court in the Central District of California in state court, and there's been an action filed by the plaintiffs in state court here in New York.

THE COURT: It was indicated to me that there was a summons with notice. Has there been a complaint filed in the case in New York at this point?

MR. ORTEGO: There has, your Honor. We have demand for complaint and summons -- we got a complaint. Our answer is due, I think, June 26. And I guess the issue before us is whether we remove or not as a related matter to this Court. We have not responded yet.

THE COURT: It was not clear to me what the claims were in the New York State court proceeding as opposed to the

1 claims here. MR. ORTEGO: As I read them, the claims are slander, 2 3 torts. 4 THE COURT: Not any kind of breach of contract? They 5 are not contractual claims? 6 MR. ORTEGO: The plaintiff's claims, no. In 7 California there are such claims. THE COURT: In New York, it is just slander, 8 9 defamation? 10 MR. ORTEGO: Correct. Intentional torts. 11 MR. SANDERS: Your Honor, may I just add that there is 12 a request for a declaration that there is no contract, so the 13 contract claim is before the New York Supreme Court. 14 THE COURT: Because I don't think that I have that 15 complaint. 16 Go ahead. 17 Finally, before I hear from them and I will let you 18 respond, particularly you can go further with regard to the injunction. Is there anything else that you wanted to address? 19 20 MR. ORTEGO: Judge, I just wanted to address that with 21 regard to the venue, that California law should most likely 22 apply with regard to any contract issues -- not that this Court 23 isn't capable of applying California law.

THE COURT: I don't have any contract issues.

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MR. ORTEGO: You don't before you, Judge, that's

correct.

Judge, also with regard to exercising jurisdiction over these particular defendants, I guess they would have to rely on long arm jurisdiction with regard to this as well. And with regard to long arm jurisdiction, 302(a)(3) or with regard to any long arm jurisdiction, you have to find some act within the state or that they committed some act within the state or they had contacts. If they committed acts within the state, the only tortious activity that is alleged that took place in the state are these lawyer letters back and forth. This is activity that created damage within the state. One is a settlement negotiation between a California lawyer and counsel in this matter. One is in-house counsel to counsel out in California.

THE COURT: I don't understand that to have been alleged to have committed any damage. This is a declaratory judgment action.

MR. ORTEGO: It is, Judge, and I guess that I am addressing the jurisdictional issue.

THE COURT: I understand, but the way you just characterized it, what do you understand the issue to be as to what damages were caused by the letter?

MR. ORTEGO: Your Honor, they argue that they need a declaration for the copyright or the declaration of the ownership of the film, who is entitled to the film because,

otherwise, they will be damaged here.

THE COURT: I understand that. It is more of a question for them. That's not the analysis for jurisdiction. What might happen, the analysis for jurisdiction is that they committed a tortious act outside of New York and that tortious act caused damage in New York. What is your understanding as to what damages had been caused in New York?

MR. ORTEGO: Judge, I can't conceive of -- I don't understand what damages could have been caused in New York by a letter of that nature. For example, one of the damages that was alleged in New York was that Al Pacino would have been involved in the film and this debate and threats by the lawyers in California resulted in Al Pacino not being involved in the film.

We submitted a declaration from the agent for Al Pacino that there were no threats, that he was not concerned about that, and we submitted that and they no longer raise those threats.

Judge, I don't know what damages have occurred in the state. The movie went on. They filmed the movie. They are in production. They got financing for the movie. The movie has moved forward, is my understanding. They talked about having to go to this Toronto film festival, and I don't understand this. They never registered for the firm to go. I don't see any damage that has occurred.

1 THE COURT: The correspondence that you referenced is the correspondence between the California lawyers? 2 3 MR. ORTEGO: Correct, both in-house and outside. 4 THE COURT: All of the correspondence, other than the 5 litigation here in New York, all of the correspondence between 6 the lawyers was correspondence between California lawyers? 7 MR. ORTEGO: It was, except the most recent e-mail 8 letter that came up. There was a correspondence between, 9 settlement negotiations between counsel here and the lawyer in 10 California and that letter is referenced. Other than that, all 11 was in California. 12 THE COURT: Was that correspondence prior to the suit 13 being filed? 14 Subsequent, Judge. MR. ORTEGO: No. 15 THE COURT: Then let me hear from the other side, and 16 I will let you respond. 17 Mr. Sanders. 18 MR. SANDERS: Good morning, your Honor -- good 19 afternoon. 20 I want to address a few points that were raised by 21 Mr. Ortego. 22 There are numerous references in the record that 23 reflect that Infinity, Mr. Ohoven had every intention of 24 shooting a movie in New York, knew that Mr. Jarecki was living

both in New York and in California.

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THE COURT: What basis do you have to assert that they knew at the time that he was living and working in New York?

MR. SANDERS: A few bases.

On our reply brief annexed to Mr. Jarecki's reply declaration, there are numerous e-mails, correspondence between him, Mr. Ohoven and other parties where Mr. Ohoven, Mr. Mann freely acknowledged that Mr. Jarecki was in New York working on the movie.

THE COURT: I am not sure specifically what was in New York working on the movie at the time they were doing -- the instant they were doing the correspondence, or just in general?

MR. SANDERS: Both. And in fact, there's one e-mail where Mr. Jarecki tells Mr. Ohoven he is in New York, he is headed for JFK.

THE COURT: Why does the plaintiff's presence in New York have anything to do with personal jurisdiction over the defendant?

MR. SANDERS: If the only issue was the plaintiff's presence in New York, I would agree with you.

THE COURT: So that is not the determinative issue?

MR. SANDERS: No. What is determinative is, the

defendants reached out to the plaintiff and worked with him

while he was in New York in the course of setting up a movie in

New York. Mr. Ohoven sent offer letters to Mr. Pacino, to

Susan Sarandon, to Jennifer Connelly, to Jennifer Garner saying

the movie will be filming in New York.

THE COURT: What difference does it make where they intended to film the movie? That is not a basis for jurisdiction. If you say to me you intend to try a case next week in China, it doesn't mean that you get to be served and sued in China.

MR. SANDERS: Fair enough.

Let's look at Mr. Turen. And at the point in this motion, Mr. Turen's allegations should be taken as true. What Mr. Turen writes was not in November of 2010, but in May of 2010, I traveled to New York and visited several potential locations, I met with location owners and discussed terms on which they would make their properties available for the production.

THE COURT: That is jurisdiction over Mr. Turen. How is that jurisdiction over Mr. Ohoven?

MR. SANDERS: Mr. Turen is working for Mr. Ohoven, is working for Infinity.

THE COURT: That is not what that affidavit says.

That affidavit doesn't say, I am here on behalf of Mr. Ohoven.

MR. SANDERS: It says he is here on behalf of Infinity, fair enough.

THE COURT: You don't say that that is a basis to assert jurisdiction over Mr. Ohoven because Mr. Turen says that he was in New York on behalf of Infinity?

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               MR. SANDERS: Infinity is wholly owned by Mr. Ohoven.
      It is the vehicle through which he is producing movies.
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               THE COURT: Is it your position that because it is
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      wholly owned by Mr. Ohoven, that the allegation simply that Mr.
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      Turen is here on behalf of Infinity gives me jurisdiction over
     Mr. Ohoven?
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               MR. SANDERS: I don't think the presence of Mr. Turen
      alone gives you the basis to find jurisdiction over Mr. Ohoven.
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               THE COURT: Let me just isolate and then we can
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      discuss those issues. You don't claim that either Infinity or
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     Mr. Ohoven was doing business in New York on any continuous
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     basis where you assert --
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               MR. SANDERS: Absolutely not. This is about specific
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      jurisdiction under 302(a)(1) and 302(a)(2).
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               THE COURT: Your argument is that, one, because Mr.
      Turen acted in New York on their behalf --
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               MR. SANDERS: -- as well as Mr. Salerno and
     Ms. Rosenthal.
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               THE COURT: Salerno and Rosenthal?
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               MR. SANDERS: That's correct.
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               THE COURT: I will get back to them.
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               The primary argument is that Mr. Turen acted in New
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      York.
            Mr. Turen is their surrogate that puts them in New York.
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               MR. SANDERS: That's correct.
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               THE COURT: And, two, that the fact that they e-mailed
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and had phone conversations with your client while your client was physically in New York is primarily, if not solely, your basis for personal jurisdiction over Mr. Turen and Infinity?

MR. SANDERS: Over Infinity and Mr. Ohoven.

It is Mr. Turen. It is Mr. Salerno. It is Ms. Rosenthal. It is efforts to access a state and city tax credit program that was designed to bring foreign productions into New York.

THE COURT: In the abstract, I don't understand how that is physical contact with New York. What are you saying they did? Someone came to New York, went to someone's office and said, give me -- I don't understand.

MR. SANDERS: Sure. Mr. Salerno and Mr. Ohoven discussed the preparation of an application to the New York City motion pictures.

THE COURT: They discussed that in California?

MR. SANDERS: Mr. Salerno never went to California -
Mr. Salerno did visit California, but Mr. Salerno lives in and is based in New York.

THE COURT: Are you saying that there is a phone conversation between Mr. Salerno and Mr. Ohoven?

MR. SANDERS: That's correct.

THE COURT: And because Mr. Salerno is in New York and Mr. Ohoven is in California, that that is a basis for jurisdiction?

1 MR. SANDERS: Together with Mr. Turen engaging Ms. Rosenthal --2 THE COURT: What did Ms. Rosenthal do in New York on 3 4 behalf of Infinity and Mr. Ohoven that is the basis of 5 jurisdiction? MR. SANDERS: She cast actors for the movie. 6 7 THE COURT: She cast actors for the movie when? MR. SANDERS: In July and August of 2010. 8 9 THE COURT: She cast actors for the movie by doing what activity in New York? 10 11 MR. SANDERS: In doing activity in New York by 12 reaching out to actors to see who was available and interested 13 and providing information -- presumably what a casting agent 14 I don't have Ms. Rosenthal's declaration. does. 15 THE COURT: And Ms. Rosenthal was hired by whom? MR. SANDERS: Mr. Ohoven. 16 17 THE COURT: And not by your client? MR. SANDERS: That's correct. 18 19 And was paid by Infinity or Mr. Ohoven, we are not 20 sure whom. 21 THE COURT: Rosenthal casted the move? 22 MR. SANDERS: She participated in some of the casting. 23 THE COURT: And what is the nature of that activity 24 that you say is activity that connects or holds Infinity to New 25 York?

MR. SANDERS: Ms. Rosenthal is a New York City based casting agent. I haven't spoken with her, so I don't know specifically what she did, but what casting agents do is, they reach out to actors and determine who is eligible, who is available during the production period --

THE COURT: So how much activity are you relying upon -- a phone call, several meetings -- over what period of time? What is the significance of the activity that you say warrants assertion of jurisdiction?

MR. SANDERS: Ms. Rosenthal started on the movie in July and stayed on through production.

THE COURT: If I see you in June and I see you again in September, that doesn't tell me -- you can say that you give me the same sort of analysis, that doesn't give me significant context.

You don't have any more details as to what particular activity that you are relying upon that you say was happening in New York, that you say is their business activity in New York?

MR. SANDERS: With respect to Ms. Rosenthal, they engaged her. She is in New York. They paid her in New York -- engaged her for the purpose of finding actors for the movie. I think when you put that together with Mr. Turen, with the multiple phone calls to Mr. Jarecki from the Infinity office --

THE COURT: Mr. Jarecki doesn't have a New York

office? 1 2 MR. SANDERS: Yes, he does. 3 THE COURT: He did not give them a New York office 4 address. 5 MR. SANDERS: Yes, he did. It is on the copyright 6 registration certificate. 7 THE COURT: Because it is on the copyright registration certificate doesn't mean he gave it to Ohoven and 8 9 Infinity. 10 Is it your position that Ohoven and Infinity knew that 11 Mr. Jarecki was a New York resident, had an office and was 12 working out of New York? 13 MR. SANDERS: Absolutely. The record is clear on 14 that. THE COURT: The record before me is not clear on that. 15 Where in the record does it say that? 16 17 MR. SANDERS: Mr. Jarecki alleges in his opposition declaration to the motion to dismiss --18 THE COURT: That what? 19 20 MR. SANDERS: That he maintains a residence on Worth 21 Street, just blocks from this courthouse. 22 THE COURT: I didn't even see where he claims he had 23 an office. 24 MR. SANDERS: His law office is his home and his

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office.

1	THE COURT: So it is not a separate office?
2	MR. SANDERS: He maintains a 917 New York City number
3	at all times.
4	THE COURT: He has a 917 number on his cell phone?
5	MR. SANDERS: Correct.
6	THE COURT: Does he have a business land line?
7	MR. SANDERS: Yes, he does.
8	THE COURT: Does he ever communicate with Mr. Ohoven
9	or any other representative of Infinity on his New York land
10	line?
11	MR. SANDERS: I would be surprised. Mr. Jarecki
12	rarely uses a land line.
13	THE COURT: So I should not assume that there is any
14	significant telephone communication with Mr. Jarecki on any New
15	York land line?
16	MR. SANDERS: I think there is not a significant
17	communication with Nick Jarecki on any land line anywhere in
18	the world.
19	THE COURT: You don't claim that Mr. Ohoven was ever
20	in New York?
21	MR. SANDERS: No, we don't.
22	THE COURT: And you don't claim that any discussions
23	or any negotiations between Mr. Ohoven and Mr. Jarecki, that
24	any of that took place in New York?
25	MR. SANDERS: Well, it took place with Mr. Jarecki in

New York and Mr. Ohoven in California.

THE COURT: Mr. Ohoven was not in New York?

MR. SANDERS: No. Mr. Ohoven was never in New York during this period.

THE COURT: The number of communications that you gave with regard to e-mails and the phone calls, is it your position that all of those phone calls that you referenced were phone calls when Mr. Jarecki was in New York?

MR. SANDERS: That's correct. On Mr. Jarecki's deposition declaration, we submitted both his phone records and his air travel records to establish that the phone calls that we isolated took place while Mr. Jarecki --

THE COURT: You do not claim that, as to any of those particular phone calls, that Mr. Ohoven had any reason to know where Mr. Jarecki was?

MR. SANDERS: The e-mails submitted on the reply declaration established that Mr. Ohoven did in fact know that Mr. Jarecki was in New York on many of those phone calls. The e-mails, the air travel, the phone records -- the totality of the circumstances is clear that Mr. Ohoven knew Mr. Jarecki was in New York. They were planning to produce a movie together in New York. He called Mr. Jarecki, reached out to Mr. Salerno, engaged Ms. Rosenthal and sent Mr. Turen.

THE COURT: But Mr. Ohoven was never in New York?
MR. SANDERS: Mr. Ohoven was never in New York.

16GUJARC THE COURT: Mr. Jarecki never met with Mr. Ohoven in 1 New York? 2 3 MR. SANDERS: No, he did not. THE COURT: Does Mr. Jarecki have an office in 4 5 California? 6 MR. SANDERS: He also maintains a home and office in 7 California. 8 THE COURT: When you say home and office, is that the 9 same place? 10 MR. SANDERS: It is the same. 11 THE COURT: He doesn't have a separate office from his 12 home? 13 MR. SANDERS: No. 14 THE COURT: He has a residence in California and a residence in New York? 15 16 MR. SANDERS: Correct? 17 THE COURT: Where is he domiciled? MR. SANDERS: I don't know. 18 THE COURT: Where does he vote? 19 20 MR. SANDERS: I don't know. He files taxes in both 21 New York and California. 22 THE COURT: Do you have any authority that would say 23 that e-mails can be the basis for asserting jurisdiction? 24 MR. SANDERS: An e-mail alone, no.

THE COURT: Well, an e-mail even in conjunction with

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anything else; do you have any authority that says an e-mail 1 adds to your contacts, your jurisdiction? 2 3 MR. SANDERS: I think an e-mail standing alone 4 doesn't. 5 THE COURT: I don't know any e-mail standing alone --6 MR. SANDERS: E-mail, together with Mr. Ohoven's 7 knowledge that Mr. Jarecki is in New York does. THE COURT: Knowledge is not the question. Contact is 8 9 the question. It doesn't matter where he thinks he is. 10 matters whether or not he is taking action in New York, that 11 one would expect that if a dispute arose out of that activity, 12 that you would be hauled into New York to be sued. 13 Do you think that e-mails add to that analysis, 14 support for that position that it gives you greater contacts 15 with someone in another state than you would otherwise have if you didn't have e-mails? 16 17 MR. SANDERS: Yes. I think correspondence with 18 someone or an entity that one is doing business with in another 19 state, any correspondence, whether it is e-mail, whether it is 20 physical mail, whether it is phone calls. 21 THE COURT: What is the business that you say was 22

being done in New York at the time?

MR. SANDERS: I don't understand.

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THE COURT: What was the business that the two of them were transacting with each other in New York?

MR. SANDERS: They were trying to negotiate a deal to put a movie together. At the same time, they were putting that movie together. They were hiring actors. They were hiring a producer.

THE COURT: I don't mean to interrupt you. I really should focus you on what I think is more critical.

We have two different lawsuits going on. We have a contractual dispute and we have a copyright dispute. For you to assert jurisdiction, you have to tell me how this is related to the copyright.

MR. SANDERS: Fair enough.

THE COURT: It is irrelevant that you give me all of these contacts about negotiations for a movie. That is irrelevant. That has nothing to do with the copyright.

The problem I see when I try to use that analysis that you want me to use -- your primary argument, if not your sole argument -- I will give you two arguments, and you can see if you can convince me of either.

One is that the nature of your claim with regard to your owning the copyright, that the situs of that dispute is New York. That is your first argument.

Your second argument is that the defendants who committed a tort, the damages of which they should have expected has occurred in New York.

Let's deal with the less complicated part, as I see

lit.

What is the tort?

MR. SANDERS: The tortious activity is slander on title, to copyright.

THE COURT: But that is not this case.

MR. SANDERS: The tortious activity is taking the position that they have an interest in copyright.

THE COURT: That is not a tort. That is a legal dispute. And that is related to your injunction question because I looked and said, what is the injunction you want?

You want me to prevent them from claiming that they have some interest in your copyright. That's a legal opinion. That's a dispute between the parties. I can't muzzle them. That is not appropriate for injunctive relief to say that you can't claim that it is yours. If I did that, most of the people I see everyday couldn't come here. They may have a weak case, a frivolous case, a strong case, but it is not my role to tell them whether or not they can or cannot claim that it doesn't all belong to you — because of the nature of the negotiations between the parties and the agreements between the parties, they have some interest in this film.

Why is that a tort for them to say, it is not just yours, it is mine? That is a legal claim. That is not a tort.

MR. SANDERS: It is a legal claim if they assert it in a court of law.

THE COURT: They did. You have a case going on in 1 California in which that is what they are claiming. 2 3 MR. SANDERS: They do not assert copyright 4 infringement. They do not assert copyright ownership. They 5 are in state court in California. 6 THE COURT: Why is asserting copyright ownership a 7 tort? MR. SANDERS: It is a slander of title. 8 9 THE COURT: Why is that a slander of title? 10 MR. SANDERS: To say that Mr. Jarecki does not have 11 the full power and authority to license his copyright and 12 control his copyright --13 THE COURT: People say that every day in numerous 14 lawsuits that I see. That doesn't make a --15 MR. SANDERS: They have not alleged that in a lawsuit. THE COURT: So you are saying --16 17 MR. SANDERS: We are not suggesting that you enjoin 18 them from filing a lawsuit. We welcome, and I don't think Mr. Ortego would sign a complaint where Mr. Ohoven or Infinity 19 20 alleges copyright infringement. 21 THE COURT: You claim their simple assertion that they 22 had an interest in this copyright, in and of itself, 23 constitutes a tort? 24 MR. SANDERS: Correct. 25 THE COURT: I have never seen that in a case.

there some authority for that position?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ SANDERS: We can certainly brief your Honor on cases alleging a slander of title by taking --

THE COURT: You have briefed me numerous inches so far. I assume that it is not a case that you have submitted — it is not — that you have an interest in someone else's copyright, in and of itself, is a tort, if you make that legal claim.

MR. SANDERS: We can amend our complaint to add the claim for slander and libel which we have pending --

THE COURT: No, you can't because that is not the basis for which you are asserting jurisdiction in this case. You already have that in another case. You cannot amend it now just to try to get jurisdiction over them because you said that you are properly in this court because they have committed a tort and that tort has caused injury in New York and therefore they should be called into a New York court. And you characterize that tort as claiming that they have an interest in the copyright that they do not in fact legally have. That's the way you have characterized the tort.

MR. SANDERS: In alleging that claim to third parties and alleging that claim under circumstances where they knew that we would have to disclose it to our bank, our distributors and our --

THE COURT: Even if I get past that, if they have

alleged that and I can accept the fact that that's a tort, what is the damage?

MR. SANDERS: Let's talk about the damage that has already occurred.

By Mr. Mann's letter, by both Mr. Mann's conversations with Mr. Trattner, whatever Mr. Ohoven did or did not say, it was certainly clear that Mr. Ohoven and Infinity Media were claiming an interest in this copyright and, as a result, bank financing that was supposed to close early in March was stalled. Mr. Jarecki had to incur substantial additional expense to explain the claim to the bank, to the bond company, procure additional insurance —

THE COURT: What bank is that and where is that bank located?

MR. SANDERS: It is Union Bank of California.

THE COURT: Well, that is not New York, is it?

MR. SANDERS: But the harm to Mr. Jarecki and to his companies, Arbitrage PSC and Arbitrage LLC occurred in New York.

THE COURT: What harm occurred in New York that you say caused those activities in California?

MR. SANDERS: It caused the New York entities and Mr. Jarecki to have to incur additional expenses that they would not have had to incur.

THE COURT: In California?

1 MR. SANDERS: No, in New York. They wrote a check out of their production office in New York --2 3 THE COURT: That standing law that because they live 4 in New York, it causes damage in New York -- that standard 5 argument that is routinely rejected. Just because they live in 6 New York, that is not a basis for you to argue that the tort 7 caused injury to them in New York. MR. SANDERS: If the act causes Mr. Jarecki and his 8 9 companies to incur expense and pay that expense all over the 10 world --11 THE COURT: But that's not what you allege. 12 declaratory judgment. You don't allege any damage. 13 MR. SANDERS: No. We are not alleging damage. 14 THE COURT: That's the problem that I have. This is 15 your preemptive strike. You filed this suit to avoid damages. 16 You filed this suit because you wanted declaratory judgment --17 MR. SANDERS: We want to stop the damages that are 18 continuing. 19 THE COURT: What damages are continuing? 20 MR. SANDERS: The expense that we have had to incur to 21 get through financing. 22 THE COURT: I don't understand what that is. 23 MR. SANDERS: The additional bank expenses. 24 THE COURT: What is that? 25 MR. SANDERS: The additional insurance expenses.

1	THE COURT: I am not sure what you are referring to
2	and how much you are talking about.
3	MR. SANDERS: Several hundred thousand dollars.
4	THE COURT: To do what?
5	MR. SANDERS: To secure insurance policy.
6	THE COURT: That you would not have had to have done
7	otherwise?
8	MR. SANDERS: That's correct. There was an enhanced
9	premium.
10	THE COURT: That insurance is New York insurance or
11	California insurance?
12	MR. SANDERS: It is worldwide.
13	THE COURT: Where did you get the insurance from?
14	MR. SANDERS: The insurance was from London, but it
15	insures a New York company.
16	THE COURT: But it is not insurance that you got in
17	New York from a New York company?
18	MR. SANDERS: It was placed through a New York broker
19	from a Lloyd's of London
20	THE COURT: Are you asserting that that is a basis for
21	New York connections because you had to get insurance from a
22	London broker, a London company here in New York?
23	MR. SANDERS: No. What I am asserting is that the two
24	New York companies and New York resident had to pay for and
25	secure insurance company, anywhere in the world

1	THE COURT: Which two New York residents?
2	MR. SANDERS: Mr. Jarecki is a New York resident,
3	Arbitrage PSC
4	THE COURT: Arbitrage PSC is not a party in this
5	litigation.
6	MR. SANDERS: It is not a
7	THE COURT: So their damage is irrelevant, isn't it?
8	MR. SANDERS: Arbitrage PSC is a personal loan app
9	company for Mr. Jarecki.
10	THE COURT: But it is not the plaintiff.
11	MR. SANDERS: It is not the plaintiff.
12	THE COURT: So the damages to them are irrelevant to
13	the analysis for personal jurisdiction.
14	MR. SANDERS: I disagree. I think that the damages to
15	Arbitrage PSC come out of Mr. Jarecki's pockets. He is the
16	sole shareholder, the sole owner of Arbitrage PSC.
17	THE COURT: No. Unless you tell me it personally came
18	out of his pocket
19	MR. SANDERS: It did, and Mr. Jarecki is an insured
20	under this policy.
21	THE COURT: Are you saying that Mr. Jarecki incurred
22	expense personally?
23	MR. SANDERS: Yes, he did.
24	THE COURT: Or Arbitrage incurred that expense?
25	MR. SANDERS: Mr. Jarecki.

THE COURT: It came out of his personal funds? 1 2 MR. SANDERS: Insurance expense --3 THE COURT: I thought you just said the opposite. I 4 thought you just said it was the company that paid it. MR. SANDERS: The companies and Mr. Jarecki are all 5 6 insureds under the policy. 7 THE COURT: Say that again. MR. SANDERS: The companies and Mr. Jarecki are all 8 9 insureds under the policy. 10 THE COURT: But that doesn't matter who is insured 11 under the policy. It matters who incurred the expense. 12 expense do you claim Mr. Jarecki incurred personally as a 13 plaintiff as a result of the tort that you say that they 14 committed, a claim that they had an interest in? 15 MR. SANDERS: Sure. He provided funds for the company 16 to write the check to the insurance company. 17 THE COURT: What does that mean? MR. SANDERS: It means that he wrote a check from his 18 19 bank account. It had to go through the production company in 20 order to get the New York State, New York City production tax 21 credits. 22 THE COURT: So you are saying that the additional 23 insurance that he had to write and the -- I am not sure what --24 MR. SANDERS: Increased bank fees. 25 THE COURT: I am not sure what that means or what that

fees.

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MR. SANDERS: A higher interest rate on the facility that ultimately closed than the facility that was supposed to close.

THE COURT: It was in fact a higher interest rate?

MR. SANDERS: A higher interest rate and additional

THE COURT: Mr. Jarecki, did he pay those?

MR. SANDERS: He provided additional funds to the

company so that the company could make those payments.

THE COURT: But he didn't have to do that.

MR. SANDERS: Yes, he did.

THE COURT: No. He had no legal obligation to do that.

MR. SANDERS: He could have let the movie fall apart.

THE COURT: That obligation was not his personal obligation, right?

MR. SANDERS: It wasn't an obligation at all, it was a choice either to incur the additional expense --

THE COURT: But he didn't incur the expense. It was a choice made by the company.

MR. SANDERS: Mr. Jarecki is the company.

THE COURT: That is the opposite of the argument that I get when you are here representing a company and you are telling me that the individual is not the person you should

sue.

So to make sure I understand the argument, you are saying that the tort that they committed was in California claiming that they had an interest in the copyright and that the foreseeable damage that that caused to the plaintiff in this case is that it made him personally have to incur certain financial obligations?

MR. SANDERS: That's correct. And I think the other foreseeable --

THE COURT: But he didn't have to incur those. They didn't make him -- he didn't have to do anything. It is the company that did it.

MR. SANDERS: Well, if he didn't do that, if he didn't finance his company --

THE COURT: Then the company would have gone under.

MR. SANDERS: Then the company would have gone under and the movie would have blown up.

THE COURT: And the company would have had a cause of action. But he didn't have a cause of action, did he? He doesn't have a cause of action based upon what the company lost, does he?

Is he the copyright owner?

MR. SANDERS: Yes, he is.

THE COURT: Personally?

MR. SANDERS: Yes, he is.

1 THE COURT: As opposed to the company? MR. SANDERS: There's a license to the company. 2 3 Jarecki is the owner of the copyright. 4 THE COURT: So he is the copyright owner and that they 5 should have known that by claiming they had an interest in the 6 copyright, that they would have caused him damages personally 7 and that the damages that they should have understood that it was going to cause him is that the company itself would have to 8 9 buy greater insurance and have to refinance? Those are the 10 natural, foreseeable consequences of their claiming that they 11 had an interest in the copyright, and it was a natural 12 foreseeable consequence that those damages were going to happen 13 immediately? 14 I think the expected consequence MR. SANDERS: Yes. was that the movie would collapse. 15 16

THE COURT: Why is it damages to him in New York as opposed to California? How much time did he spend in New York as opposed to California?

MR. SANDERS: This year, far more time than in California.

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THE COURT: During that period of time when you claim they committed a tort?

MR. SANDERS: He was exclusively in New York. The records submitted in the opposition declaration reflect that Mr. Jarecki was continuously in New York from December of 2010

straight through the production of the motion picture.

THE COURT: But December 2010 through the motion picture is not the operable time.

MR. SANDERS: We are talking right now about March of 2011, Mr. Jarecki was in New York.

THE COURT: Why is March of 2011 the operative date with regard to them violating your copyright?

MR. SANDERS: March 1, 2011, Mr. Ohoven sends an e-mail to Mr. Jarecki, knowing full well that he is in New York preparing to produce the picture that says, at this point you leave me no choice but to make a formal claim against you and the project to protect my rights.

Three days later, you have Mr. Mann's' letter to Ms. Lichter asserting claims to copyright, knowing full well that Mr. Jarecki and the production are proceeding in New York, and there is correspondence between Ms. Lichter and Mr. Sachs, also in March of 2011.

THE COURT: But you are not claiming that the communication that you are relying upon that you characterize as the tort was a communication to bind Mr. Ohoven or his attorneys to anyone other than to Mr. Jarecki and his attorneys?

MR. SANDERS: Absolutely. And coupled with the phone calls from both Travis Mann and Andrew Mann to Greg Trattner on finances --

THE COURT: Who is Greg Trattner and what does he have to do with the bank financing and insurance?

MR. SANDERS: Mr. Trattner is a senior vice president of Film Finances Inc. Film Finances is referred to as FFI in our papers and provides completion bonds for motion pictures. What a completion bond does is, it guarantees to the bank that the picture will be produced on time, on budget and delivered to distributors. Film Finances says, we are not touching this because of the Infinity claim. Everything collapses.

THE COURT: So what does Film Finances do in response to that communication?

MR. SANDERS: What Film Finances said is, we are happy to provide a completion bond as long as it excludes claims by Infinity and Mr. Ohoven, which is what compelled Mr. Jarecki to seek an insurance policy from Lloyd's against those claims because the bank said, you have to make us whole. You have to make us satisfied that if there is an Ohoven or Infinity claim, that we have some cover.

THE COURT: You are saying that delayed the financing because you hadn't had time to go get the bond, and that time that you used to go get the bond, in that period of time, the interest rate went up?

MR. SANDERS: Yes. The bank required, because this was now a higher risk facility, an increased interest rate, additional fees. And believe me, I know that we are going to

get a bill for every minute that the bank's lawyers, the distributor's lawyer and Film Finances' lawyers spent understanding what was going on here before they were comfortable closing.

THE COURT: That's not the nature of the complaint you make here. The nature of the complaint that you filed here is not some sort of willful false activity that you claim that they were engaged in that is the subject of this dispute. The subject of your dispute is irrelevant to any damages or any tort. You just want in this case, this Court to determine that you in fact are the copyright owner to the exclusion of them or anyone else. That has nothing to do with a tort.

MR. SANDERS: Well, it does because the natural consequence of not determining that Mr. Jarecki is the sole copyright holder or all of these damages that result from a cloud on title. A cloud on title prevents Mr. Jarecki from delivering the film, paying back the loan facility, precludes Mr. Jarecki from delivering to distributors, precludes Mr. Jarecki from seeking distributors for territories that have not barred the film yet.

THE COURT: So you say that the fact that they made this claim to whom?

MR. SANDERS: To Mr. Trattner, to Ms. Lichter.

THE COURT: You can't claim that because they said it to Ms. Lichter that that is a tort.

MR. SANDERS: I think you can.

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THE COURT: What tort is that? 2 3 MR. SANDERS: I think it is slander of title. 4 THE COURT: If they say it to your client and they say 5 it your client's attorney? If I call you a name and it is just 6 me, how is that slander? 7 MR. SANDERS: I agree with you, if it is just you and me, but in this instance, it wasn't --8 9 THE COURT: You are saying that somehow the fact that 10 he communicated it to your client directly and he communicated 11 it to your client's lawyer adds something to the tort of 12 slander. It does not add anything to the tort of slander. 13 They have the right to say anything to you and your client, 14 don't they? 15 MR. SANDERS: With the expectation that my client has a duty to disclose it to third parties, it does add quite a 16 17 bit. THE COURT: What duty does your client have to 18 disclose it to third parties simply because they say it to you? 19 20 MR. SANDERS: Because Mr. Ohoven who had produced more 21 than 25 feature films, has generated more that \$600 million to 22 motion picture finance, knows full well that a filmmaker has to 23 grant representations and warranties that there is no claim --24 THE COURT: That may be true, but that doesn't make it 25 slander if your client repeats it.

1	MR. SANDERS: Then let's focus on the communications
2	to Mr. Trattner which are undisputed.
3	THE COURT: What kind of communications?
4	MR. SANDERS: We have claims against this film. It is
5	repeated three times throughout, presumably, between March and
6	April.
7	THE COURT: Written or oral communications?
8	MR. SANDERS: Oral.
9	THE COURT: So he said that to him and, as a result of
10	that, he does what?
11	MR. SANDERS: Mr. Trattner says, we will not bond this
12	aspect of this movie.
13	THE COURT: Is there somewhere in these papers where I
14	can look to see that the reason he said he wasn't going to do
15	this was because of this communication?
16	MR. SANDERS: Mr. Trattner doesn't say it, but you can
17	review Mr. Jarecki's moving declaration.
18	THE COURT: In what way does Mr. Jarecki know this and
19	has said this?
20	MR. SANDERS: He knows it
21	THE COURT: Mr. Trattner
22	MR. SANDERS: Because the bank says to him
23	THE COURT: Who says to him?
24	MR. SANDERS: The bank.
25	THE COURT: Who? The bank is not a person.

MR. SANDERS: Representatives of Union Bank. We don't mention Alex Cho by name, but it was Alex Cho who is the senior vice president.

THE COURT: Says to him that the reason we are doing this is because of this information that we were given --

MR. SANDERS: Absolutely correct.

THE COURT: That's your tort argument. What is your argument that under some other specific jurisdiction theory that they have, they were engaged in activity in New York that serves as a basis of your declaratory judgment action asserting that you are the copyright holder?

MR. SANDERS: In the March letter, Mr. Mann alleges that Infinity's development activities towards the picture grant them an interest in copyright. Those development activities include Mr. Turen's activities both scouring locations, meeting with actors in New York --

THE COURT: But that activity is irrelevant to your cause of action. That activity is totally irrelevant to your cause of action. That might be the things they want to assert in terms of why they claim that they have an interest, but that is not the basis of your lawsuit.

Your lawsuit is basically, I have a copyright. I want this Court to determine that I exclusively have this copyright because somebody out there is claiming they have an interest in the copyright, and I want this decided once and for all.

I understand that claim. What has any relevance to

New York for you to prove that claim or for you to even assert

that claim? What difference does it make whether or not they

are basing it on something that they say happened in New York?

That activity is not the activity that is the basis of

your lawsuit. The activity that is the basis of your lawsuit

is, whatever interest you have in the copyright and whatever

claim of interest they have in the copyright. What is the

claimed interest that they have in the copyright that has anything to do with New York?

MR. SANDERS: The facts on which they base their claim that they have an interest in copyright are Mr. Turen's discussions and communications with Mr. Jarecki about the screenplay.

THE COURT: Which happened --

MR. SANDERS: -- in New York and California.

THE COURT: I don't have any indication that they did any work which is the basis of the co-authorship claim that they made with regard to the copyright that happened in New York.

MR. SANDERS: Two responses to that, your Honor.

First, I think you will search this record very deeply to find any activity that gives a basis for co-authorship --

THE COURT: That doesn't help them or you, and you have the first --

MR. SANDERS: In which case jurisdiction is over. 1 THE COURT: No, in which case you have no claim. 2 3 Maybe that is not a question of jurisdiction. You claim that there is a copyright issue. You can't have it both ways. You 4 5 cannot say there is absolutely no basis for co-authorship, no 6 activity that constitutes co-authorship and have them claim 7 that the basis for co-authorship is the activity that went on in California, and then you try to say to me you have some 8 9 basis to hang your hat on that for jurisdiction in New York. 10 MR. SANDERS: No. They claim the basis for 11 co-authorship in the developmental activities of the picture, 12 not sitting down next to Mr. Jarecki and saying, here's this 13 suit --14 THE COURT: No. Absolutely not. If that's their 15 claim, I can toss that claim pretty quickly. That's not a 16 copyright claim. 17 MR. SANDERS: I agree with you, your Honor. 18 why we are here, but Mr. Mann's letter says, based on our 19 development activities -- and I am going to read that -- in 20 addition, to the extent that --21 THE COURT: But that is not a violation of copyright. 22 That is a contract. 23 MR. SANDERS: It is an assertion of rights in

THE COURT: No. The assertion of rights in

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copyright.

copyright -- and that's why I asked them if they were just going to end this case and just keep it as strictly a contractual dispute rather than a copyright --

MR. SANDERS: We welcome that.

THE COURT: The only issue with regard to whether they had a direct interest in the copyright that is different from a contractual either agreement or licensing is whether or not they are the author, right?

MR. SANDERS: I agree with you.

THE COURT: There is no other legal issue.

MR. SANDERS: What they state is, Infinity has an ownership interest in the results and proceeds of the services of Mr. Turen and others and the underlying property rights to the picture, including without limitation an ownership interest in the screenplay.

THE COURT: But the ownership interest in the screenplay has nothing to do with a copyright.

MR. SANDERS: How so?

THE COURT: You could give them an ownership interest in the screenplay without them having a copyright.

MR. SANDERS: I disagree.

THE COURT: You cannot say, I will keep the copyright but I will give you a 20 percent ownership in the screenplay and its proceeds?

MR. SANDERS: That is an interest in copyright.

THE COURT: You don't have to transfer interest in the 1 2 copyright. 3 MR. SANDERS: Absolutely you do. An ownership 4 interest in copyright would have to be transferred by a written 5 exclusive license --6 THE COURT: That doesn't say ownership interest in the 7 copyright. MR. SANDERS: It says in screenplay --8 9 THE COURT: In the screenplay --10 MR. SANDERS: Unless they were talking about the 11 physical paper that the screenplay was written on, I don't know 12 what other interest they could be referring to. 13 THE COURT: That's a contractual issue. That is all 14 of the claims that they make in the California case. None of 15 those are copyright claims. 16 MR. SANDERS: I agree with you that their only 17 claims --18 THE COURT: You don't claim that that is a copyright 19 claim, do you? 20 MR. SANDERS: Absolutely. 21 THE COURT: You think that is a basis for someone to 22 legally allege that they have an interest in the copyright, to 23 simply say, I did work on it so, therefore, I have an interest 24 in the screenplay?

MR. SANDERS: That's the essence of this case, your

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Honor.

THE COURT: You think that is a legal basis and that if they proved that -- that they could validly prove that they independently have an interest in the copyright as opposed to some interest that was granted to them or some quasi-contractual interest that they could possibly have?

MR. SANDERS: I do not think that is a winning case.

THE COURT: It is not even a viable case.

MR. SANDERS: I know, but that is exactly what they are alleging in Mr. Mann's letter.

THE COURT: But that is not what you are alleging in your complaint. You are alleging in your complaint that you want a declaration that you are the sole owner of the copyright, that the copyright that is registered to you is properly registered to you as its sole owner.

Their only claim that is even a viable claim, other than some contractual or semi-contractual right is no, I wrote it, they didn't write it, or I wrote it with them or we both came up with this. Those are the copyright claims.

MR. SANDERS: That is what Mr. Mann is alleging. He is saying --

THE COURT: That part I understand.

MR. SANDERS: He said Mr. Turen did, as a work made for hire, and you heard Mr. Ortego say he was an independent

contractor.

THE COURT: But he didn't do that in New York.

MR. SANDERS: He did it in New York and California.

THE COURT: No, he didn't do it in New York.

What allegations have they made or what allegations do you make that gives you a basis to assert that the writing of this piece happened, that they say that they were involved in happened in New York.

MR. SANDERS: Mr. Turen's deposition.

THE COURT: He says it happened in New York? He wrote it, co-authored it in New York?

MR. SANDERS: He says he provided comments to Mr. Jarecki in New York.

What the defendants are saying is that Mr. Turen's comments to Mr. Jarecki: A) Are presumably independently copyrightable or they are work made for hire and they give them an ownership interest in the screenplay.

Granted, your Honor, we are agreement with the defendants that jurisdiction is proper in California and, where we disagree is that it is also proper in New York.

THE COURT: You have a significant burden here because there is absolutely no official business activity between the plaintiff and the defendant that physically occurred in New York where the two of them were in New York working.

MR. SANDERS: Other than Mr. Turen and Mr. Jarecki,

no, but Mr. Turen and Mr. Jarecki were together in New York.
Mr. Jarecki spent most of 2000 --

THE COURT: What is it about what happened in New York that is relevant to a determination that you are the copyrighter?

MR. SANDERS: The screenplay was written in New York.

THE COURT: What difference does it make in terms of what you want in terms of declaratory relief? What difference does it make that your client wrote the screenplay in New York?

MR. SANDERS: That the defendant's representative provided comments on that screenplay to my client in New York --

THE COURT: So you are saying that the substantial contact by the named defendants that gives you a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over them where they are not otherwise present in New York is because Mr. Turen claims that he gave some suggestions to your client while Mr. Turen and your client were in New York, and those suggestions were incorporated into his writing —

MR. SANDERS: That is the dispute right there.

THE COURT: I am trying to understand what you say is the basis for jurisdiction.

MR. SANDERS: I think you have to look at what the defendants' claim is the basis for ownership of the screenplay, which is the provision of comments by Mr. Turen and others --

some of which happened in New York, some of which happened in California.

THE COURT: What is the extent of the comments that you are relying upon that happened in New York that --

MR. SANDERS: Demonstrably, there is more in California.

THE COURT: You have to give me some significant contacts. You are trying to have me base this on this happening one time, ten times --

MR. SANDERS: There is only one instance where Mr. Turen talks about commenting on the screenplay in New York to Mr. Jarecki.

THE COURT: One time.

So you are not relying on any other contributions to writing the screenplay for the basis of specific jurisdiction other than this one time when Mr. Turen was in New York and said he gave a suggestion to Mr. Jarecki?

MR. SANDERS: No. What we are relying on -- and I go back to what I call defendants' incorrect assertions -- it is not just Mr. Turen's written comments but the development activities for the picture --

THE COURT: They cut it in California.

MR. SANDERS: No, in New York and California.

The development activities are setting the picture up, choosing locations --

THE COURT: That has nothing to do with the copyright.

MR. SANDERS: I agree with you, your Honor. The defendants don't take that position.

THE COURT: It doesn't matter what position they take. You brought this lawsuit. I am trying to figure out what is determinative of this lawsuit. You acknowledge that that is not determinative of this lawsuit. It is totally irrelevant to this lawsuit, and it is not even a viable position for them to come in this court and allege as a defense your claim that you own the copyright.

MR. SANDERS: But that is the basis upon which they allege an ownership interest in the copyright.

THE COURT: That they did what?

MR. SANDERS: That on pages 7, 8 and 9, the opposition to the motion to dismiss, we lay out the development activities the defendant is basing its interest in copyright on. We don't think those development activities rise to the level of copyright. They do. That's the dispute right here.

THE COURT: I don't know of any case law at all that would support a position that, because you attempted to develop a manuscript into a book or a screenplay into a movie, I don't know of any case law that says that is any colorable argument and that that constitutes a right in the copyright.

MR. SANDERS: We agree wholeheartedly.

THE COURT: But you can't rely on that for

jurisdiction.

MR. SANDERS: But they are saying that those activities give them a copyright interest, and they have communicated to us -

THE COURT: But I am asking you, what activity do you claim that your claim arises out of. That's the analysis. It doesn't have anything to do with what they claim. The analysis is that you have hauled them into court in New York. I have asked you, what is the basis on which you say that you should be in New York because they were engaged in activity which makes the situs of your dispute New York and engaged in New York activity that you claim creates the basis for your lawsuit? What is their activity that you claim creates the basis for your lawsuit?

MR. SANDERS: Their activity that we claim is the basis for a lawsuit is the assertion of an interest in this copyright.

THE COURT: That happened in California.

MR. SANDERS: Upon which they base development activities.

THE COURT: It doesn't matter what they base it on.

They could base it on air, if they want to. But the activity that you say creates the cause of action that you brought here is their assertion in California that they own the copyright?

MR. SANDERS: That's correct.

THE COURT: You don't even claim that the lawyer or --1 you said Mann and someone else, they made comments to someone. 2 3 MR. SANDERS: To Mr. Trattner. 4 THE COURT: Who is in California. So everybody they made comments to that you are aware of that you base your 5 6 lawsuit on are in California, and all the comments that you 7 base your lawsuit on that gives you a basis to raise this 8 declaratory judgment claim, all of that activity happened in 9 California? MR. SANDERS: And comments to Mr. Jarecki. They were 10 in California. Mr. Jarecki was in New York. There's the March 11 12 1 e-mail from Mr. Ohoven to Mr. Jarecki. 13 THE COURT: What is the basis? 14 MR. SANDERS: To make a formal claim against you and 15 the project. There were numerous phone calls in December. 16 THE COURT: What is it about that e-mail that you say 17 creates a cause of action? MR. SANDERS: "I have no choice but to make a formal 18 19 claim against you and the project." 20 THE COURT: You think that that creates a cause of 21 action? 22 MR. SANDERS: I think it is an assertion, coupled with 23 the March letter, clearly asserting a claim in copyright, this is what Mr. Ohoven sent to Mr. Jarecki. 24

THE COURT: I understand that.

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1	Anything else on that argument that you want to be
2	heard on?
3	In your preliminary injunction, you would like me to
4	issue a preliminary injunction to maintain what status quo?
5	MR. SANDERS: Maintain the status quo that the
6	plaintiff has ownership in the copyright.
7	THE COURT: But that is the nature of the dispute.
8	Isn't that the end of this case or the beginning of this
9	case I can't make that determination at this point, can I?
10	MR. SANDERS: And to enjoin the defendants from
11	seeking to exploit the picture.
12	THE COURT: Enjoin them from doing what?
13	MR. SANDERS: Seeking to enter into licensing
14	agreements, seeking to
15	THE COURT: On what basis do I have to conclude that
16	there is any imminent danger of that happening?
17	MR. SANDERS: There is imminent danger that they will
18	interfere with our distributor.
19	THE COURT: How?
20	MR. SANDERS: By asserting claims to copyright.
21	THE COURT: Is there any evidence that they have done
22	anything like that up to this point?
23	MR. SANDERS: Sure. The communication with
24	Mr. Trattner.
25	THE COURT: The communications with Mr. Trattner did

not say you can't market this film.

MR. SANDERS: It says we have an interest in copyright.

THE COURT: Do you have any basis to believe that they have done anything to interfere with your production of this film or intend to do something to interfere with the production of this film other than to claim that they have a copyright interest in this film?

MR. SANDERS: They are claiming a copyright interest in this film inherently.

THE COURT: I understand that argument, but is there anything else?

MR. SANDERS: No, there is not.

THE COURT: So you just want me to enjoin them from claiming they have a copyright interest until you prove they don't have a copyright?

MR. SANDERS: We want you to enjoin them from taking any steps to interfere.

THE COURT: What steps? I cannot give you an injunction except to prevent them from doing something that they were doing or prevent them from doing something that you think that there is some evidence that they are imminently going to do.

MR. SANDERS: Let me respond with two points.

First, I think that the communications with Mr.

1 Trattner and to Ms. Lichter. 2 THE COURT: Say that again. MR. SANDERS: The communications to Ms. Lichter and 3 Mr. Jarecki, knowing full well --4 THE COURT: So you don't want them to talk to 5 Mr. Jarecki or Ms. Lichter any further, is that basically it? 6 7 MR. SANDERS: I don't care who they talk to or who 8 they sue --9 THE COURT: You have to articulate for me what 10 injunction you want. What do you want me to order them not to 11 do? 12 MR. SANDERS: To order them to not interfere with 13 plaintiff's exhibition of the film. 14 In what way do you have in your mind THE COURT: How? 15 that it has happened or it is getting ready to happen that you want me to specifically tell them --16 17 MR. SANDERS: I understand your Honor's discomfort. 18 THE COURT: I don't have any discomfort. That's the 19 way I issue injunctions. I don't say, don't do anything to 20 hurt the other side. 21 MR. SANDERS: We don't want them communicating and 22 claiming that they have a copyright interest in this film. 23 THE COURT: And you think I have the authority to say 24 to them that they can't say publicly, consistent with the 25 lawsuit that they filed, that they think they have an

interest --

MR. SANDERS: They have not filed a lawsuit saying they have an interest in copyright. They filed a lawsuit saying they are entitled to monies because we breached a contract.

THE COURT: Have they answered in this case?

MR. SANDERS: No, they have not.

Let me respond.

First, I think that you can enjoin them from attempting to exploit the film.

THE COURT: In what way do you have evidence that they intend to exploit the film to do you irreparable injury?

MR. SANDERS: The other is, we have their past conduct and we believe they will take any steps that they can.

THE COURT: Like what?

MR. SANDERS: Like contacting Mr. Trattner --

THE COURT: If they contact Mr. Trattner, how is that going to stop the film from being made?

MR. SANDERS: It makes it impossible for Mr. Jarecki:

A) to deliver to existing licensees because he would be in breach of the representation and warranty that he has clean title.

THE COURT: Your client cannot claim he has clean title. You have a problem with the title. That is a reality. Until that cloud is lifted, until you prove your case in a

court of law, there is a cloud over the title. I cannot make the clouds go away. There is nothing that I ordered them to do. All anyone has to do is pick up the paper and walk into the court in California and New York see that there is a cloud over your title.

MR. SANDERS: I don't think anyone is going to pick up the document in California and say, hey, Mr. Jarecki and Infinity have a contractual or a tort dispute that is not going to interfere with our ability to release this film.

THE COURT: As long as you have a declaratory judgment outstanding --

MR. SANDERS: Fair enough --

THE COURT: -- and then a lawsuit to sue them so that you can get a judicial determination that they have no interest and you do, there is a cloud over the title.

MR. SANDERS: Your Honor, I reluctantly agree, and that's precisely why we suggested that you exercise your discretion to convert this motion to one for summary judgment.

There are really only two facts at issue here, as you have noted. Was there a contractual transfer of copyright interest under Section 204 of the Copyright Act? Was there an intent to create a joint work?

We would submit that there is no discovery that needs to happen on that point. If it is helpful to your Honor and to the defendants, give them 30 days to produce evidence that

there was a contractual transfer or that there was an intent that someone other than Mr. Jarecki be the author of the film, then I think we can get to the same place.

THE COURT: Well, the contractual transfer, is that really my issue or the California issue?

MR. SANDERS: It arises under Section 204 of the Copyright Act, either there is a writing signed by the copyright owner or there is not.

What they said in the California case, Mr. Jarecki made an oral promise that he would sign a transfer, and maybe they have a reliance argument, but there is no copyright interest that arises from it.

THE COURT: Let me see if I can wind it up.

Let me hear from Mr. Ortego.

MR. ORTEGO: Judge, I just have two things that I wanted to raise with regard to the motion.

First, on the motion for summary judgment, we received 36 hours ago in a reply brief, a suggestion for a summary judgment motion which I respectfully ask the Court not to entertain in any way. It is a reply brief. You gave them an extra 10 pages and it became a motion for summary judgment.

Secondly, Judge, I did misspeak, I think, to the Court about Mr. Turen. I think we both had a discussion with regard to him being president. He must have had authority to bind the company and he wasn't, he had to be an employee.

THE COURT: That's usually what president means.

MR. ORTEGO: That's that I thought so too, Judge, and I agree with you, but I have a declaration from Kevin Turen that was submitted by Mr. Jarecki in response or in support of his preliminary injunction motion. He states in paragraph 7 of that declaration, "While I provided significant services for Infinity during the Turen/Infinity period, at no time was I an employee of Infinity, any of its subsidiaries or affiliates or any entity controlled by Michael Ohoven."

THE COURT: But he was an officer of the company?

MR. ORTEGO: Judge, I don't dispute that, but he submits an affidavit.

THE COURT: I am just trying to figure out, are you saying that that is any distinction that is somehow in your favor in terms of whether he was an employee? He is the president of the company. He is an officer of the company. He could have worked for one dollar, a million dollars or no dollars. He could have been gratuitously the president of the company, but the president of the company, if this is a valid legitimate company, has the authority to act on behalf of the company.

MR. ORTEGO: I guess what I am trying to say, Judge, from the perspective of the jurisdiction, it doesn't seem clear to me now when Mr. Turen was having his conversations or discussions with Mr. Jarecki in New York, whether or not he was

acting on behalf of the company and for it to create jurisdiction according to this. I just throw that out, Judge. I don't know where it is. I didn't submit the declaration, but it is different.

The only other thing about this, Mr. Trattner is a California resident. First, they alleged threats, but I looked at his declaration. There seems to be no threat, simply a claim, and I don't think that the declaration said that we alleged a copyright claim, but just for the record, I just wanted the declaration there. That was submitted also on behalf of plaintiffs.

And that's all that I needed to add at this point, your Honor. You have our briefs and papers.

THE COURT: I am going to go ahead and rule.

I find that the contacts that were relied upon are not significant enough to assert personal jurisdiction over either the company in California or the individuals in California.

It has been acknowledged that neither Mr. Ohoven or Mr. Jarecki ever met together in New York for the purposes of advancing this film.

There is no direct connection between Mr. Ohoven and New York. His only reliance in this case is upon the e-mail communications which, in and of itself, don't establish a basis for jurisdiction, and the telephone conversations with the person on the cell phone.

Quite frankly, even if one were to assume that Mr. Ohoven was aware that Mr. Jarecki was in New York at the time that he sent the e-mails or at the time he spoke to him on the phone, even that, in and of itself, is not significant enough contact to haul into New York a defendant that has never set foot in New York and that one would, with due process, reasonably expect that because we spoke to them on the phone in New York or e-mailed them and they were in New York either on a part-time basis or for some continuous limited period of time, that that itself would create significant enough contacts to base jurisdiction on.

I think Mr. Turen's activity itself, there is nothing that the plaintiff relies upon that in and of itself would constitute sufficient activity to haul a defendant into court.

Everyone here is a California person, and the negotiations and activity significantly and primarily are California negotiations and activities. Other than the periods of time that Mr. Jarecki was in New York and the anticipated activity that would be related to making the film, they might in the future take place in New York, in some preliminary activity in anticipation of making a motive, there is no significant contacts out of which this lawsuit arises.

Beyond that, I think that even if the contacts were more substantial, the real question is whether or not this lawsuit arises out of those contacts.

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Nothing that happened in New York created this lawsuit or contributed to the circumstances under which the plaintiff brought its lawsuit. The lawsuit is simply a declaratory judgment that the California company and the California individual who has asserted in California that they own an interest in the copyright, that the plaintiff seeks purely a declaration that those assertions are invalid and have no legal basis for them to make such a claim. That being the very, very limited issue that this case addresses, I cannot find, dealing with New York's long arm statute, that that is the set of circumstances that one could say that this lawsuit arises out of activity that occurred in New York and that the defendant could possibly anticipate that a lawsuit in New York would arise out of the activity that the plaintiff is asserting puts a cloud over their interests in the copyright that they wish they had lifted, given the declaratory judgment in this case.

Beyond that, even the theory of a tort being committed outside of New York causes injury in New York, this lawsuit, first of all, is not a lawsuit about damages that resulted in New York from a tort. That is not what this lawsuit is about.

This lawsuit is strictly a declaratory judgment lawsuit as to who has an interest in the copyright. That being said, there is no valid analysis that could be applied here that this lawsuit is to vindicate a tort that occurred, that was committed by the defendants in this case and caused injury

to the plaintiff in New York.

That is not what this lawsuit is about. That's the analysis that the statute requires. That is the nature of this lawsuit. The nature of this lawsuit relates to a tort committed by a defendant outside of New York that in fact caused injury to the plaintiff in New York. It is not this lawsuit. This lawsuit could have been brought anywhere that there is otherwise personal jurisdiction over the defendants, clearly in California.

As I say, even if I could accept the analysis the defendant committed a tort in California by claiming they had an interest in the copyright and that assertion caused injury to the defendant in New York, it is still unrelated to a declaratory judgment action as to who in fact does own the copyright.

The analysis, no relevant testimony is determinative with regard to a tort or with regard to tortious activity that caused injury to the plaintiffs in this case. No analysis of any such evidence is even relevant to a determination of who owns the copyright.

The tort itself has been characterized as a statement that they owned the copyright. A statement that they owned the copyright, whether it is a tort or not a tort, whether it caused the injury or didn't cause injury to the plaintiff when the statement is made is totally irrelevant to who in fact owns

the copyright. If that's the issue in this case, that is the only issue in this case, and that would be the issue in this case whether or not the defendants had made such a public statement, even if such a public statement were to be characterized as not just false but defamatory.

In this case, it doesn't matter whether they made such a statement or didn't make such a statement; that is only what precipitated the plaintiff bringing this lawsuit and increased their fear that if they did not make clear who owned the copyright, that they might suffer damages in future. So whether or not the defendant whispered that in the plaintiff's ear or said it to their lawyer or e-mailed it to them, it is totally irrelevant to whether in fact it is true.

The only connection with New York with regard to that particular issue is solely the plaintiff's residence in New York, to the extent the plaintiff has a residence in New York. At this point, the record only indicates that he has a joint residence of New York and California and that there's no evidence that New York is the defendant's domicile.

And there is no evidence that the primary activity between the parties — if there is any evidence — well, there is clearly no evidence that the primary activity between the parties, or in any way related to who owns the copyright and whether or not the plaintiff has exclusive right to its registered copyright, that the primary activity is relevant to

that activity that occurred in New York.

So I think there is not a sufficient basis to try to assert jurisdiction over a California corporation that does not do business no New York, over a California individual who is not a resident of New York, and there is no indication that they have any presence in New York — the individual has not even been to New York — and that the company has any business activity in New York that is either related to or unrelated to the question of whether or not a copyright in fact exists exclusively in the plaintiff's ownership.

So I think that the contacts are insufficient for asserting personal jurisdiction on either one of these defendants. I think that not only the contacts are insufficient, but even if they were more substantial, this lawsuit for declaratory judgment as to who owned the copyright is not a lawsuit that arises out of some relevant activity in New York. This is separate from the contractual dispute in California and separate from any licensing agreement or any agreement of the parties that the defendant would have some interest.

Even with regard to some independent assertion that they contributed to the screenplay, even if one were to credit that activity as being somehow legally significant to merit a determination that they — or the defendants in addition to the plaintiff — would have some interest in the copyright, the

activity that would serve as the basis for such a legal assertion is not primarily significant New York activity.

At this point I am willing to transfer the case -- if you want the case transferred rather than dismissed -- to the Central District of California, which seems to be the place that is appropriate for both venue and jurisdiction purposes.

And even using at least a forum non conveniens venue analysis with regard to where this case is appropriate to be brought, it is much more significant and the nature of the activity and the witnesses all primarily have some connection with California and the Central District of California. And as to venue, the Central District of California would be more appropriate than the Southern District of New York, given the nature of primarily the contact, the California contacts, the California witnesses and the nature of the activity among the parties to the activity and for the parties to rely upon to establish their right to the copyright itself. It is a very limited issue. And, in fact, all of the other issues that were related to that, other than the state court defamation issue in the state court, can make its own determination as to whether that is a appropriate case on jurisdiction or on merit.

This case solely puts at issue who is the registered legal copyright owner and has no significant connection with any activity in New York that is going to be determinative of that issue or of this lawsuit -- the declaratory judgment on

the copyright ownership issue, that it arises out of substantial, significant or relevant New York activity.

So based on those findings, I determine that there is not a sufficient basis to assert jurisdiction over the defendants in this case in New York. And, as I say, rather than dismiss the case, in the alternative, I am prepared to transfer this case, and if the plaintiff would prefer me to transfer, I will transfer this case to the Central District of California as opposed to dismissing this case so that the parties can attempt to resolve their outstanding disputes in a forum that is appropriate. They can resolve this and the related cases.

Mr. Sanders, do you have a position?

MR. SANDERS: We prefer transfer to the Central District of California.

THE COURT: I will issue an order for transfer, and that will be the Court's decision, with the plaintiff preserving its right for appeal purposes to object or seek reversal of the decision to transfer to the Central District of California based on lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants — I can't call it a copyright infringement case, but I call it a copyright claim case. If this were a copyright infringement case, I think it is appropriate to send this case back to California, and you can determine whether in California you want to resolve all of the issues in one forum or have

several different forums. That is my determination. I will issue an order today transferring this case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants to the Central District of California. MR. SANDERS: Thank you, your Honor. 0 0